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The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda is a global peace and security architecture conven-
tionally understood as emerging from a suite of UN Security Council resolutions and accompanying
member state action plans over the last twenty years. The agenda serves as a major international
gender equality initiative in its own right and as a prominent example of the broadening of security
practices in global politics. In this paper, we present the first truly systematic analysis of the agenda,
drawing on a novel dataset of 213 WPS policy documents from across the UN system, national gov-
ernment initiatives, and regional and international organizations published between 2000 and 2018.
We argue that the degree of variation in the WPS agenda is frequently underestimated in conven-
tional models of norm diffusion and policy transfer, and instead propose an account of the agenda as
a dynamic ecosystem shaped by reproduction and contestation. Our empirical mapping runs counter
to established narratives about the development of the agenda, producing insights into the pace and
location of the growth of WPS; the hierarchy of its key “pillars”; the emergence of new issues; the
development of rival versions of the agenda; and the role of domestic institutions in shapingWPS pol-
icy. We find support for the claim that the WPS agenda is pluralizing in significant ways and provide
illustrations of points of fracture within the agenda at large. Our argument has significant implications
for the WPS research agenda and for scholarship on security norms and policy more broadly.
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After decades of scholarship dragging questions of gen-
der frommargin to center, there is nowwidespread accep-
tance that war-making and peace-making are fundamen-
tally shaped by how peoples and communities enact and
transform gendered relations of power (compare, e.g.,
Squires and Weldes 2007; Reiter 2015).1 Among practi-
tioners, the recognition may be tracked in initiatives like
“gender mainstreaming” in security communities such
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); in
the appointment of gender advisors for peacekeeping
missions and in key portfolios at the United Nations
1 The phrase “margin to centre” echoes hooks (1984).
(UN); and in the advent of indices and frameworks
explaining interstate conflict by reference to the degree
of patriarchy within societies (Hudson et al. 2009). If
taken at face value, proclamations in favor of gender
equality are now so ubiquitous as to suggest an almost
universal ethical commitment by the society of states.
In this article, we examine the preeminent manifesta-
tion of the international security politics of gender, in the
form of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda.
The WPS agenda, now nearing the end of its second
decade, is the most significant collective effort to reform
international security practices in accordance with fem-
inist principles, broadly understood. As we will show,
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“WPS” has become an umbrella term for an array of
campaigns, policies, and blueprints that take “a gender
perspective” on the causes, character, and resolution of
war and associated forms of violence.2 Whether in pro-
moting women’s inclusion in the armed forces or urging
their involvement in ceasefire negotiations, practically all
peace and security initiatives undertaken in the name of
gender equality since the turn of the century may be read
as specimens of the agenda.
The WPS agenda is a paradigmatic case of the ex-
panding terrain of global security. Arising in part from
the 1995 Beijing Conference, the fourth and last of the
UN-sponsored World Conferences on Women, and in-
formed by feminist peace activism spanning a century,
the WPS agenda was at least initially seen as a major
concession by the great powers of the Security Council
(Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003; Tickner
and True 2018; but see also Otto 2010). WPS is now one
of the most established thematic issues on the Security
Council docket, numbering ten dedicated resolutions at
the time of writing, as compared to the ten on children
and armed conflict, seven on the protection of civilians,
and five on non-proliferation.3 The agenda is significant
2 In its preambulary sections, the first of the WPS res-
olutions passed by the Security Council explained it-
self by reference to “the urgent need to mainstream
a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations,”
which it suggested at a minimum entailed attention to
“(a) The special needs of women and girls during repa-
triation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reinte-
gration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures
that support local women’s peace initiatives and in-
digenous processes for conflict resolution, and that in-
volve women in all of the implementation mechanisms
of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the
protection of and respect for human rights of women
and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitu-
tion, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary”
(United Nations Security Council 2000, 2, 3). The phrase
“gender perspective” is today common currency in the
field.
3 This count is based on the thematic items listed
by the UN Security Council Resolution project at
http://unscdatabase.com at the time of writing. See also
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/
thematic-items. At the time of writing, the ten WPS res-
olutions are UNSCR 1325 (2000); UNSCR 1820 (2008);
UNSCR 1888 (2009a); UNSCR 1889 (2009b); UNSCR
1960 (2010); UNSCR 2106 (2013a); UNSCR 2122 (2013b);
UNSCR 2242 (2015); UNSCR 2467 (2019a); and UNSCR
2493 (2019b). We do not include clearly related, but
technically distinct, resolutions on issues such as
as a field in its own right and as a key case study in the
contestation of the terminology and practice of “interna-
tional peace and security.” In this article, we argue that
the agenda represents a field of activity so complex, and
with such contested vectors of development, that it re-
quires new tools to think with in order to adequately
capture its substance and impact on world politics. We
propose the concept of policy ecosystem as a way of un-
derstanding the field of WPS activity and of drawing ana-
lytical attention to dynamics of the field’s (re)production
that are frequently overlooked in contemporary conven-
tional accounts.
Our argument proceeds in four sections. First, we de-
scribe the WPS agenda and the stakes of our analysis.We
show that WPS is not adequately captured in prevailing
conceptions of norm diffusion or regime formation, de-
spite the many insights yielded by these approaches. The
various norms embedded in the agenda do not currently
significantly constrain state behavior, are in some cases
ambiguous or in tension, and are not obviously the mo-
tive for much of the activity that happens under the label
of WPS. IR’s present concern with norms establishes a
horizon against which all practice is implicitly, and usu-
ally explicitly, judged, such that other questions and in-
terpretations are crowded out.
In the second section, we build on our critique by de-
tailing the contribution that the concept of policy ecosys-
tem can make to theorizing peace and security gover-
nance, turning from the question of how theWPS agenda
diffuses, is transferred, or operates in the world to the
prior question of what the WPS agenda is. We define
the policy ecosystem as a complex field of ongoing ac-
tivity with defined but porous boundaries, within which
multiple entities and processes interact. We argue that an
ecological perspective is better able to accommodate the
multiplicity of the agenda, both in terms of the actors that
populate it and the differing claimsmade upon it, because
it does not presume a set horizon but instead treats the
field of practice as inherently open and plural.
In the third section, we reveal the complexity and dy-
namism of the agenda through an empirical mapping
of the field of WPS activity, drawing on a dataset of
213 policy documents assembled from the UN system,
national governments, and regional and international
organizations over the entirety of the agenda’s lifetime,
from 2000 to 2018. By drawing on such a range of WPS
artifacts, we are able to undertake the first truly system-
atic study of the agenda’s policy elements. Our view of
the actors and geographies involved in the reproduction
human trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse
in peacekeeping missions, such as UNSCR 2272 or
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ofWPS runs counter to some established narratives about
the development and shape of the agenda.We explore the
content of these documents to show the ways in which
“core” and “new” WPS issues are represented and trac-
ing how attention to these issues emerges, consolidates,
and diminishes over time. Our concluding remarks out-
line directions for future research on the WPS agenda
and its (re)production and comment on the significance
of our study for understanding policy dynamics in global
security politics more broadly.
WPS in Question
The WPS agenda derives from, though extends far
beyond, United Nations Security Council resolution
(UNSCR) 1325, the first of the ten resolutions to be
adopted by the Council. Adopted in 2000, and so in-
fluential that advocates often treat “1325” as shorthand
for the whole agenda, that first resolution founded a
new thematic area of Council business, drawing atten-
tion to the need to transform peace and security gov-
ernance in recognition of the ways in which prior prac-
tice had entrenched gendered inequalities and harms. In
this first iteration, the Security Council sought increased
representation of women at all levels of decision-making
around conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
provided a mandate for new appointments of women
as envoys and special representatives; listed measures to
be taken to recognize gender iniquities when negotiating
and implementing peace agreements; singled out peace-
keeping operations as an area where women’s role should
be expanded; called for special protections in response to
the violence suffered by women and girls; identified im-
punity for sexual violence crimes as a special concern;
and promised efforts to engage with women’s civil so-
ciety groups in future Council business (United Nations
Security Council 2000). Histories of the agenda tend to
stress the ambition of this first resolution and the unlikely
conditions of its success: resolution 1325 was “almost
entirely the work of civil society and non-governmental
organisations” (Cockburn 2012a, 49; see also Confortini
2012, 132). The provisions of 1325 were developed and
further specified in subsequent resolutions and, over the
course of nearly two decades, an identifiable set of po-
litical practices constituting the agenda has emerged,
as has a vibrant dialogue bridging academia, advocacy,
and policymaking (see, e.g., Olonisakin and Ikpe 2011;
Hendricks 2015; Basu, Kirby, and Shepherd 2020).
The burgeoning subfield of WPS research interro-
gates a range of these political practices from several per-
spectives. Many have examined the textual practices of
WPS, with an eye to the political possibilities that are
opened up, and foreclosed, in discourses of gender, peace,
and security (e.g., Shepherd 2008, 2011; Puechguirbal
2010; Pratt 2013). There are large-scale studies docu-
menting the participation of women both in peace negoti-
ations (Bell and O’Rourke 2010; Ellerby 2013; Anderson
2016) and in peace and security institutions (Karim
and Beardsley 2013; Olsson and Möller 2013; Huber
and Karim 2017), as well as those assessing the preva-
lence and causes of conflict-related sexualized violence
(Nordås and Rustad 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014,
2015). Researchers have also explored the “diffusion”
of WPS ideas through various mechanisms (True 2016;
Lorentzen 2017; Martín de Almagro 2018), with a par-
ticular focus on the development and implementation of
“National Action Plans” (NAPs), which function as the
framework through which states pursue their commit-
ments to the agenda. These latter studies, whether single-
case or comparative, tend to document the process of
NAP development and analyze the commitments of the
NAPs in question as an instance of implementing prac-
tice, evaluating the extent to which the NAPs embody or
even extend theWPS principles that are supposed to have
inspired them (Swaine 2009; Fritz, Doering, and Gumru
2011; Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 2014; Barrow 2016;
Aroussi 2017).
Prevailing theorizations of the agenda are premised
on specific ideas about what kind of an object the WPS
agenda is, from which flow different ways of understand-
ing how the WPS agenda can be better implemented.
The most common conceptualization of the agenda to
date is as a norm or set of norms that influence secu-
rity practices. Jacqui True, for example, describes the
WPS agenda as “the most significant international nor-
mative framework addressing the gender-specific impacts
of conflict on women and girls” (True 2016, 307), while
Torunn Tryggestad argues that the WPS agenda has al-
ready become “an institutionalised set of norms with in-
fluence on UN peace and security matters” (Tryggestad
2009, 159). The 2015 Global Study—a high-level review
commissioned by the UN Secretary-General to exam-
ine the health of WPS—proclaimed movement toward a
normative framework as the agenda’s “greatest success”
(Coomaraswamy et al. 2015, 28). Certainly, the agenda
was intended to be transformative, and its demands on
states are both proscriptive and prescriptive, seeking to
constrain some behaviors while promoting others. The
language of the framework suggests that norms are com-
plementary, the foundations, floor-plan, and facade of
a single architectural project, or perhaps different out-
posts rendered in a common style. Yet the political his-
tory of the agenda also includes significant episodes of
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construction and the final condition to be realized.4
Though the agenda can be disaggregated and studied as
a series of norms, accepted and enforced to varying de-
grees, and though parts of the agenda may one day con-
stitute a regime,much ofWPS practice does not currently
conform to standard models.
Though it is sometimes treated as a single endpoint,
WPS cannot reasonably be described as a norm, be-
cause its various normative components are diverse.
The agenda is organized into a series of “pillars,” in
most renditions covering four themes: participation,
protection, prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction.
Each can be said to imply a set of norms, usually defined
as “standard[s] of appropriate behaviour for actors with
a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891).
For example, a major prospective norm identifiable
within the WPS agenda relates to the participation of
women in peace and security governance, requiring
member states to “ensure increased representation of
women at all decision-making levels in national, regional
and international institutions and mechanisms for the
prevention, management, and resolution of conflict,” per
the first operative paragraph of Resolution 1325 (United
Nations Security Council 2000, 2. More recently, this
language has been strengthened by reference to “full”
and “meaningful” participation; see Coomaraswamy
et al. 2015, 47, 58). Clearly, there is not widespread
adherence to this norm, and women are still excluded
from peace dialogues more often than they are included
(see Coomaraswamy et al. 2015, 47–48).5
Yet even this most foundational of WPS norms covers
a domain so broad that the agenda can contain strikingly
different manifestations of it.An increase in women’s par-
ticipation in militaries and an increase in women’s partic-
ipation in diplomatic missions may both qualify as evi-
dence of the participation norm in action, even if the first
is correlated with greater levels of conflict and the latter
with greater success in negotiating peace. As this exam-
ple demonstrates, some WPS norms are procedural (as
is the case for the democratic control of foreign policy)
while others are substantive (akin to the taboo on chem-
ical weapon use). Additional norms plausibly present in
4 As Bucher (2014) has argued, the language of norm dif-
fusion itself tends to eclipse agency, and leads to over-
neat structural accounts where abstract norms do the
causal acting.
5 Assessments of the agenda often take the level of
women’s participation in peace processes and media-
tion as a key metric of progress, though there are of
course many other sites of decision-making as set out
by UNSCR 1325.
the agenda—such as the inclusion of a gender perspec-
tive in military decision-making—are more ambiguous
still with regard to concrete policy pathways.
Though WPS scholars and practitioners are keenly
aware of the differing ways in which the agenda may be
mobilized, the implications of tensions in meaning and
use have thus far not led to a reconsideration of norms
as the ultimate horizon of WPS practice. As an ambitious
peace and security agenda emerging from a wider trajec-
tory of transnational feminist activism, WPS norms are
frequently ambiguous with regard to both their domain
and their effect. There are instances of norm acceptance
that are not registered in WPS documents or practices
(such as the number of female parliamentarians in a given
country), as well as apparent evidence of norm accep-
tance in WPS documents that do not translate into prac-
tice (a phenomenon we term “aspirational” WPS). Like
True and Wiener—who describe WPS as a “norm bun-
dle” (2019, 553)—we identify antagonism and contes-
tation alongside patterns of consolidation and elabora-
tion in the agenda. Other scholars have increasingly rec-
ognized that norms do not proceed by simple diffusion
and local adaptation (Towns 2010; Bucher 2014; Chua
2017; Singh 2017;Martin de Almagro 2018;Manchanda
2020). Rather than constituting a clearly defined set of
norms, the WPS agenda might instead be viewed one
of the largest contributing element to the supernorm of
gender equality, a “cluster” of norms with family resem-
blances aspiring to “a unified and coherent framework”
(Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 18).6 However, as we
argue in greater detail below, this “coherence” is in im-
portant respects an unstable construct, produced through
claims and counter-claims, rather than existing as a logi-
cal and necessary interrelation of parts.7
In addition to the ambiguity of the agenda’s content,
the preference for norm language in assessing the agenda
is notable for its disconnect from the characteristic of
norms that usually captures the interest of IR scholars:
their effect in meaningfully constraining the behavior of
6 A different understanding of “clustering”—where dis-
tinct norms become associated with each other—has
recently been proposed but operates at a higher level
of abstraction than we are concerned with here (see
Staunton and Ralph 2020).
7 In discussing the antipoverty supernorm, Fukuda-Parr
and Hulme note that the strength in unifying more dis-
crete policies under an abstract general aim can also
prove a weakness, as major political disagreements
go unresolved (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 29). This
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international actors.8 Nearly two decades after the inau-
guration of the agenda, there is at best patchy evidence
that new standards of appropriate behavior have taken
hold, and then only in relatively isolated areas of policy
(for a review, see Kirby and Shepherd 2016). Applying
Deitelhoff and Zimmerman’s norm contestation frame-
work to WPS, there is a prima facie case that norms
within the agenda have significant validity—in that they
are widely accepted and circulated by states and other
actors—but are lacking in facticity, more rarely guiding
the actions of agents to any meaningful extent (Deitelhoff
and Zimmermann 2019, 3). A possible exception may
be the anti-sexual violence norm, widely regarded as the
area of “protection” where states have expended most
energy, and where norm violations by at least some par-
ties can be met with sanctions (see Huvé 2018; Chinkin
and Rees 2019, 7; though also Aroussi 2011). We do not
purport to provide a comprehensive accounting of which
actors accept which norms, which is beyond the scope of
our study, but rather stress the extent to which the par-
tiality and failure of norms is a regular refrain for prac-
titioners and observers alike (see Coomaraswamy et al.
2015).
The content of NAPs, regional action plans, and the
other institutional guidelines that structure the imple-
mentation of WPS might alternatively be taken to sug-
gest that WPS is a governance regime, per Stephen Kras-
ner’s classic formulation of regimes “as principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which ac-
tor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (1982,
185). It is notable that the scholarly literature on WPS
has not engaged substantively with regime theory, nor
has regime theory been applied to WPS.9 Though norms
can be identified even where there is not significant ad-
herence to their prohibitions in practice, regime theory
has been more closely concerned with effective and bind-
ing rules institutionalized at the supra-national level (e.g.
Moravcsik 2000; Garcia 2015), which are arguably in-
complete even in treaties like Committee on the Elim-
ination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
8 Norms are widely seen as limits on actions that would
otherwise be possible, and for many thus offer alter-
native explanations than may be derived from purely
“rationalist” or “materialist” premises. A selection of
pieces that shaped discussion of norms in IR include
Goertz and Diehl (1992), Finnemore (1993), Katzenstein
(1996), Legro (1997), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Keck
and Sikkink (1998), Risse and Sikkink (1999), and Towns
(2010).
9 We are grateful for the suggestion of an anonymous re-
viewer that we address this point.
(CEDAW) (Kardam 2004, 97–98). In more interactive
regime models, actors are viewed as engaging in strate-
gic action within a web of overlapping legal agreements,
for example, on trade (Alter and Meunier 2009). How-
ever, where regime theory recognizes the interaction of
diverse actors, it remains wedded to rule complexity and
the co-existence of multiple regimes in a nested “com-
plex” (Alter and Meunier 2009). Though regimes need
not revolve around a single point of legal authority, and
like the WPS agenda can include a diverse set of issue
areas, treaties and technical regulations nevertheless re-
main crucial regime elements (for the example of climate
change, see Keohane and Victor 2011; Abbot, Green, and
Keohane 2016).
Despite the inclusion of “norms” and “principles” in
the accepted definition, it is rules and procedures that
make a regime (see Kardam 2004, 89).10 The recom-
mendations of the UN Security Council, while arguably
announcing a set of expectations for states, do not in
themselves generate a gender equality regime. Where
WPS resolutions echo treaties such as CEDAW or reiter-
ate fundamental principles, they plausibly contribute to
customary international law (Chinkin and Rees 2019),
though dissatisfaction with implementation to date
underscores the inconsistency of state practice. Prohibi-
tions on sexual violence are again relevant as a partial
exception, with WPS policy commitments working to
embed the recognition of sexual violence as a war crime,
crime against humanity, and an act of genocide, while re-
lated developments—like the increased use of sanctions
against credibly accused perpetrators and development
of common standards on documentation—suggest the
emergence of a regime.11 Nevertheless, the WPS field at
large is currently too open for regime theory to provide
ready explanations of its dynamics, and there is little for
purchase for fundamental regime theory puzzles such as
10 John Ruggie’s earlier definition of a regime as “a set of
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, orga-
nizational energies and financial commitments, which
have been accepted by a group of states” (1975, 570)
is arguably more applicable to WPS, given the in-
clusion of plans and energies, though the agenda is
still some way from an interstate agreement based
on mutually binding rules. Ruggie’s examples—such
as the non-proliferation regime or the European space
programme—are highly technical.
11 As Kranser’s definition indicates, norms are an element
of regimes, and the difficulty in assessing the facticity
of WPS norms would therefore be carried forward into
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why states surrender sovereign powers to international
institutions (e.g., Moravcsik 2000).
The concrete relevance of our observations regard-
ing the limitations of viewing WPS through the lens of
either norms or regimes may be seen from the case of
NATO, which is perhaps the most prominent and widely
discussed example of internal WPS contradictions (e.g.,
Egnell 2016; Wright 2016). According to our mapping
of WPS entities detailed below, and by common consen-
sus, NATO is today a key exponent of WPS policy.12
At the same time, as a collective security organization,
it was a major target for the feminist peace movement
during and after the Cold War. It, therefore, finds itself
at odds with other equally important actors in the field,
such as the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF), a feminist anti-militarist civil society
group sometimes credited as the historical originator of
the agenda (Gibbings 2011; Tickner and True 2018).
As recently as 2009, WILPF actively participated in
coalitions calling for the dismantling of NATO, argu-
ing that it was an obstacle to peace and an agent of
expansionist militarism (Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom 2008). Opposing the notion that
war could be reformed, prominent WILPF figures posed
the challenge, on the sixtieth anniversary of its found-
ing, of “whether NATO should exist at all” (Cockburn
2012b, 136).13 WILPF’s opposition toNATOhas become
much less evident in the last decade, over the same span
that NATO has more actively embraced the WPS agenda,
starting with the 2007 and 2011 Policies for Implement-
ing UNSCR 1325 and the 2012 appointment of Mari
Skåre as the first of the NATO Secretary General’s Special
Representatives for WPS. In this, WILPF’s work on WPS
has diverged from its advocacy over nuclear weapons
and the arms trade, which continues to name NATO
as an opponent in respect of the Nuclear Weapon Ban
Treaty (e.g.,Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom 2018, 13).
In embracing the agenda, NATO officials have
worked to position the organization as a leader in some
aspects of WPS (namely protection from sexual violence
and gender balancing of armed forces) while occluding
12 For example, in their recent study of the contestation
of WPS norms, True and Wiener describe NATO as one
of the “early adopters and implementers of WPS” (True
and Wiener 2019, 564).
13 The joint “No to war—No to NATO” statement—
to which WILPF was party—was stronger still:
“Our goal is to dissolve and dismantle NATO.” See
“The Strasbourg Declaration.” https://www.no-to-
nato.org/2013/03/strasbourg-declaration/.
others (anti-militarism and conflict prevention). As WPS
champions within the organization make clear, NATO’s
integration of the gender perspective is driven at the in-
stitutional level not by feminist political objectives, but
by an orientation toward success in a concrete “mis-
sion” or “mandate” (see also Wright 2019). It is in re-
lation to such a mandate that WPS is operationalized: “a
planning machinery with gender baked into the practi-
cal tools that the military structure uses in daily life,” in
the words of the NATO Special Representative for WPS
(Schuurman 2017, 104). Both NATO and WILPF stress
the value of “participation,” but connote starkly con-
trasting gendered roles, institutional practices, political
commitments, and desired endpoints in the process.
Arguments that NATO should not be treated as a
“proper” WPS actor simply sidestep the analytical chal-
lenge posed by a variegated field of practice.14 Nor can
the tension between NATO and WILPF be read straight-
forwardly as a case of “norm decay”or as either party vi-
olating the fundamental norm.15 WPS is such a vast field
of activity, including such an array of artifacts and actors
working in concert and opposition across political space,
that a focus on norms alone, with its implication that
all WPS actors seek the same change in values and rules,
risks occluding profound differences by casting them as
variations on a single theme. NATO is far from the only
example.As critics of the agenda have argued, “WPS”has
been produced by security institutions in the global north
in forms compatible with militarism, racialized hierar-
chies, and the security state (Pratt 2013; Shepherd 2016;
Parashar 2019; Haastrup and Hagen 2020; Stavrianakis
2020). The degree of contestation and dynamism visible
across so many different planes and axes suggests a need
for a different starting point: one that can not only rec-
ognize norms where relevant but also address strategies,
texts, and practices as other than greater or lesser cases
of contestation.16 It is to this parallel form of inquiry that
we now turn.
A Policy Ecology Perspective on WPS
As our empirical mapping below demonstrates, the
WPS agenda is spreading and deepening, in uneven and
14 See Basu (2016a) on the related issue of how states on
the Security Council take up gender as part of their na-
tional interest calculations.
15 For background on norm decay, see Price (2019).
16 We recognize that others may prefer to adopt this per-
spective by revising established scholarly terms, as in
the case of opening “regime” to emphasize the role of
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sometimes surprising ways. To offer a new concept to
aid thinking about the WPS agenda, and complex gover-
nance more generally, we draw from ecology to theorize
policy. Others have made a similar move in the study of
international organizations. One such effort integrates
insights from the sociology of organizations to explore
“aggregate changes in the types and numbers of organi-
zations” (Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016, 249), where
ecology is the study of interactions among a population
of entities in a given environment and the relevant enti-
ties are organizations. Our approach differs somewhat,
as we are interested in the full range of actors and entities
in the WPS field, understand interactions to include prac-
tices, habits, speech acts, and activities beyond the entry
and growth conditions for organizations, and because
we ask constitutive questions about how WPS actors are
themselves produced, rather than treating organizations
as sharply distinct actors. We take inspiration from
conceptual work from educational studies and define the
WPS policy ecosystem as the field of activities, actors,
and artifacts interacting in the name of the WPS agenda.
Given the porosity and fluidity implied by the ecosystem
metaphor, these activities, actors, and artifacts include,
but are not necessarily limited to, protocols, policies,
guidelines, advocacy campaigns, manifestos, offices,
bureaucrats, networks, movements, institutions, training
manuals, government ministries, communities, and
individual citizens and subjects (this categorization is in-
fluenced byWeaver-Hightower 2008, 155).17 The agenda
not only operates through conventional state action,
such as sanctions against armed groups, but also efforts
to reconfigure domestic politics through changes to polit-
ical decision-making, reform of the military, adjustments
to border regimes, and integration of traditional security
into a far-reaching human rights framework (on WPS
and human rights, see O’Rourke and Swaine 2018).
We propose four advantages in developing an un-
derstanding of the concept of policy ecosystem through
the perspective of policy ecology (where again ecology
is the study of interactions among the actors, activi-
ties, and artifacts that produce policy). First, there is the
recognition of a potentially confounding diversity: an
ecosystem is by definition complex, consisting of multiple
17 We draw on Weaver-Hightower’s conceptualization of
policy ecology as a perspective on education policy
(a similarly variegated field of practice), which he puts
forward as part of “a call to complexity for policy
research, an appeal to researchers to theorize and
account for themany interconnections that create, sus-
tain, hold off, or destroy policy formation and implemen-
tation” (Weaver-Hightower 2008, 152).
organisms and features of various types co-existing in
different and relational connection to one another. Sec-
ond, interpreting policy ecologically encourages us to
think holistically. Scholars might focus on any one eco-
logical component at a given moment, but conceptual-
izing policy as an ecosystem encourages us to keep the
whole in mind even as we engage closely with its parts.
Third, conceptualizing policy through ecology also keeps
us attentive to the borderlines and boundaries between
different policy ecosystems and non-policy domains. By
delimiting the ecosystem in terms of those actors that
explicitly name their work as WPS (or are invoked by
others as doing WPS), we do not look at activity on reso-
nant themes framed otherwise, though we are conscious
that ecosystems overlap. The fourth and final benefit of
the policy-as-ecosystem concept is its utility in theorizing
implementation, and the various guidelines, plans, and
protocols developed to govern implementation practices,
as moments of reproduction. There are aspects of the
ecosystem that are stable and others that are highly mu-
table, unstable, or contested. New terms may enter the
WPS lexicon through interactions, but interaction is also
a means for elaborating and consolidating long-standing
commitments.
The plurality of policy as an ecosystem is inherent
within the complexity of the environment. There are mul-
tiple agents within the system, all of which have different
and even competing needs and interests and which make
different and sometimes conflicting contributions. The
relationship between the agents and the environment (or
“structure,” for the more traditionally minded) is one of
mutual constitution, re-affirmed and re-visioned through
the dynamism of the ecosystem. More specifically, these
processes (re)produce not only the system as a whole but
also the elements or components within it, in and through
iterative repetitions that mutate, shift slightly, revise de-
liberately, subvert, or faithfully render the assumed “orig-
inal” that was always multiple.
We recognize that there are potential pitfalls in us-
ing a naturalist metaphor to develop a conceptualization
that is then in turn built into a theory.18 Our understand-
ing of ecology is not evolutionary or teleological. While
we seize on (re)production as a lens through which to
study the politics of difference and the labor that is ex-
pended in perpetuating WPS, we do not argue that WPS
is improved over time, nor that it automatically becomes
18 Indeed, Weaver-Hightower warns against “extrapolat-
ing from an ecological view that policy is somehow
“natural” or that it should be seen as an organic,
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more complex or sophisticated. The parameters of the
ecosystem are not set in advance by inherent features,
but arise out of the relational interaction of the actors
within it, who are included by virtue of their own claims
for themselves as advocates, implementers, and critics of
WPS, or by the status in the WPS ecosystem that they are
ascribed by others.
We contend that conceptualizing theWPS agenda as a
policy ecosystem offers insight into the way that complex
policy objects/practices work: how they are propagated,
renewed, adapted, and mythologized with varying effects
that can be empirically tracked. This concept allows us
to interrogate the WPS agenda and associated agenda-
setting and implementation practices to explore those ef-
fects and explain how the agenda is being (re)produced.
An ecological perspective on policy—the study of pol-
icy fields as interconnected, bounded, and multiple enti-
ties pushing and pulling the policy issue in different, at
times radically incommensurable, directions—unsettles
the taken-for-granted assumptions about, or common
knowledge of, a policy object, and encourages creative
and careful tracing of the reproductive dynamics specific
to that particular ecosystem. In the section that follows,
we provide a new systematic account of the WPS agenda
to illustrate the utility of the concept of policy ecosys-
tem, paying particular attention to the complexity and
dynamism that is often obscured in other accounts of the
agenda as an object of study.
Mapping the WPS Ecosystem
Norms research conventionally posits a standard se-
quence by which norms take hold among a distinc-
tive class of international actors. In Finnemore and
Sikkink’s original life cycle model, norm entrepreneurs
focused their efforts on states, and it was states as dis-
crete units who were socialized and who formed the
population in which norms were eventually internalized
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). Understandably,
given the importance afforded to states in IR scholarship,
subsequent research has largely followed suit, with the
extent of WPS diffusion established by reference to the
adoption of NAPs (e.g., Björkdahl and Selimovic 2015;
Barrow 2016; True 2016). Studies of advocacy strategies
similarly foreground states as the target of campaigns
(e.g., Joachim 2003; see Carpenter 2011 for a different
approach). At the same time, the agenda is frequently
identified with the UN as an entity not reducible to its
member states, by reference to the decisions of the Secu-
rity Council as determining what states then implement,
and also in detailing the disproportionate involvement
of UN agencies and offices in taking up aspects of the
agenda, from responses to sexual violence to brokering
peace agreements to implementing peacekeeping man-
dates.
Given the complexity of the agenda’s structure and
dynamics, an inductive approach—where the agents of
WPS policy are not settled in advance within a presumed
hierarchy of global governance—provides insights that
unsettle conventional accounts. In this section,we present
a systematic analysis of the WPS agenda since 2000, as
it is captured in documentary artifacts. We have curated
a new dataset of policy documents that represent the
WPS agenda, and we interrogate these data to pose two
overarching questions: what actors convene the field of
WPS policy and which issues define the content of the
agenda over time? The two questions inform each other:
the identity of actors drives research design into norm
and policy change; and the emergence and decline of cer-
tain issues implicate different groups and entities as WPS
actors.
Who Is WPS?
The WPS agenda contains a multitude. Even before con-
sidering the range of actors now engaged in some way
with the agenda, there are numerous documentary arti-
facts that lend themselves to interrogation as part of an
investigation into WPS (re)production. Clearly, no single
article could possibly engage with the totality of the WPS
system. Our effort here is the opening move in a broader
project on the shifting terrain of the agenda. In this first
step, we choose to focus on the totality of policy texts
as key to establishing the parameters of the agenda. In
doing so we acknowledge that there are swathes of WPS
practice that are not captured in policy documents; that
there are many important texts about WPS that are not
codifiable as distinct policy; that every WPS policy doc-
ument is the outcome of bargaining, collaboration, and
exclusion; and that the agenda is situated in a dense and
contested web of global gender politics that find expres-
sion in innumerable other forms, even as they touch on
themes familiar from the agenda (see, e.g., Manchanda
2020). We are nevertheless able to sketch a new map,
even at this most obvious and explicit level of the WPS
ecosystem.
We focus on the core body of policy texts representing
the major attempts to implement the agenda between
2000 and 2018 and organize these documents into
three categories. The first category includes those pro-
duced through the UN system, comprising the Security
Council’s WPS resolutions and the Secretary-General’s
mandated reports to the Council, statements by the Pres-
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Council, such as General Recommendation 30 issued by
CEDAW (the “UN system” subset).19 Second, we include
every NAP released between 2000 and 2018 (noting
that the first NAP was released in 2005, pursuant to
the 2004 recommendation of the UN Secretary-General
and endorsed by the Security Council), representing
the fullest survey yet assembled, and including some
plans translated into English from their language of
origin for our analysis (the ‘NAP’ subset).20 Third, we
take what we believe to be the most comprehensive
collection of international and regional organization
policy on WPS, as well as those few cases where national
policy has been made outside of the context of an
NAP, such as the US Congress’ WPS Act of 2017 and
Canada’s “Feminist International Assistance Policy” (the
“Other WPS” subset).21 There are 33 such documents
in this first iteration of our dataset for a combined
total of 213 WPS policy documents across the three
categories.
Apprehending the WPS field in this way immediately
reveals a number of important features. First, the sheer
volume of WPS policy underlines its success and bol-
sters the case for an analysis of the agenda as a sig-
nificant security governance project. This point is well
known to WPS scholars but is under-appreciated in the
wider literature. In documenting the volume of WPS pol-
icy, we also stress that the WPS agenda resides in and
is governed by no single document, even a document
with the authority provided by the imprimatur of the
UN Secretary-General or Security Council. Importantly,
19 On this last, see O’Rourke and Swaine (2018). We count
fifty-five WPS policy documents generated by the UN
system. We do not include high-level reviews (e.g.,
Coomaraswamy et al. 2015) or downstream implemen-
tation guidelines.
20 Seventy-eight states produced at least one iteration of a
NAP (including Bougainville and Tajikistan; these states
are often counted in assessments of extant NAP states
as they have produced NAP-like documents) in the re-
search period. Thirty states have formulated multiple it-
erations of their plan, producing a dataset of 125 indi-
vidual documents produced over the period 2000–2018.
There are in addition some domestic approaches to
WPS, which do not rise to the level of policy and which
we are therefore not able to include, as in the case of
India; see Basu (2016b).
21 We have chosen to include these other national doc-
uments in this third category rather than along with
the NAPs in order to preserve comparability between
NAPs, which are to some extent written in a common
policy “style,”.
our collection of documents indicates that states are com-
plemented by a diverse collection of other institutions—
some domestic, some supranational—which implement
the agenda in ways that may involve symmetry or di-
vergence, and where the identity and motives of parties
are not always evident (e.g., because the same state may
feed into WPS policy in multiple fora as well as in na-
tional plans that are the product of domestic bureaucratic
bargaining).
Second, we are able to track when WPS gained trac-
tion across various levels and domains. In the language
of norm diffusion, we can make out a “tipping point” in
2010 (see figure 1); the number of policy artifacts pro-
duced between 2000 and 2010 steadily rose, and subse-
quently there has been relative stability in the number
of WPS events (notwithstanding a small spike in 2017;
again see figure 1). Of course, much more granularity
would be required to understand “norm diffusion,” a
question we bracket given our position on the norm lit-
erature outlined above. Nevertheless, our different cat-
egories of documents broadly confirm the existing view
of when the agenda consolidated (figure 2; see also True
2016), while demonstrating more clearly how regional
and non-NAP national initiatives became more common
in several regions.
Third, by subdividing the documents produced each
year by the type of entity that produced them we confirm
that it was states in particular that proliferated WPS
policy artifacts after 2010; the activity of member states
(including “national government” and “national gov-
ernment non-NAP” in figure 2) accounts for the greatest
increase in WPS policy documents. More recently, states
have implemented WPS outside the context of NAPs,
through bespoke government initiatives and occasionally
legislative action, which create parallel mandates for
the agenda (see below). The “domestication” of WPS
is thus confirmed as a key feature of the ecosystem in
need of further analysis and confounds the persistent
description of WPS as “the United Nations” WPS
agenda’.22
Fourth, we note that the geography of WPS is more
complex than often appreciated. While the first NAPs
were issued by European governments (and specifically
22 Of course, scholars of WPS are keenly aware of the ex-
istence of national action plans, and numerous studies
takeNAPs as their central focus (e.g., Swaine 2009; Lee-
Koo 2014; Kaya 2016; Haastrup and Hagen 2020). How-
ever, it is still remarkably common to see the agenda
analyzed as occurring within the UN Security Council
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Figure 1. Number of WPS policy documents produced by year (n = 213)
“good citizen” states such as Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden: see Dunne 2008; Tryggestad 2014; Lyytikäinen
and Jauhola 2020), the earliest policy document to take
up the mission of UNSCR 1325 outside the UN was the
Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, agreed
by the African Union in 2003, followed by the Solemn
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa and the Dar
Es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy
and Development in the Great Lakes, both in 2004. Al-
though in all three cases references to WPS are fleeting
in comparison to what followed, they point to a larger
pattern of early adoption. Between 2000 and 2009 (the
first half of our period of analysis), African regional or-
ganizations account for six of the eight policy documents
issued outside of the UN and member state NAPs.23 The
first NAP outside of Europe was also located in Africa
(Cote d’Ivoire in 2008).
23 The set of “regional organization” documents for this
period includes the first NATO directive on 1325. Note
that in figure 2 NATO is listed as a separate class to
other regional organizations to more clearly indicate its
outsized influence.
From this mapping, we are able to make visible areas
of contestation that would otherwise remain obscured.
For example, one underappreciated early “diffusion” of
the WPS agenda occurred in 2005, when an amendment
to Israeli national law-implemented aspects of the WPS
agenda (specifically around women’s participation) was
matched by a Palestinian Presidential decree endorsing
1325 (for an analysis, see Farr 2011; also Aharoni 2014).
Neither document is captured by the conventional NAP
or UN-centric approach to the agenda. The then-novel
WPS frame was expected to yield new forms of peace-
building through women’s participation, such as when
Jerusalem Link (an organization of Israeli and Palestinian
women) engaged in an Arria formula meeting in 2002,
subsequently cited as a promising example in the key
early UN study of WPS (United Nations 2002, 58). As
might be expected from arguments for the participation
norm, at this moment women’s involvement on both sides
appeared to create new space for a dialogue about peace.
However, the “harmony of interests” conception
of women’s role in peace-making is less useful as an
explanation for the subsequent divergence of approaches
to the agenda. In the build-up to the issuing of the Pales-
tinian NAP, the overwhelming emphasis of civil society
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Figure 2. WPS documents, by issuing entity and location (2000–2018).
occupation,” stressing displacement, fragmentation of
families, land confiscation, settlements, and arrests as
key vectors, with a secondary emphasis on gender-based
discrimination within a “conservative and traditional”
Palestinian society (Nazzal 2009, 12–14). UNSCR 1325
was viewed as “a new tool for engaging against and
exposing the policies of the aggressive occupying state
that violates international resolutions and legitimacy”
(Nazzal 2009, 22; see also MIFTAH 2017). These
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Palestinian NAP, where strategic objectives relate over-
whelmingly to gender-based discrimination linked to the
occupation, such as imprisonment, house demolitions,
and harassment at checkpoints; resilience against the
occupation, through sponsorship of women’s initiatives;
and seek to hold occupation forces accountable through
legal redress, especially through UN and international
bodies (Palestinian Ministry of Women’s Affairs 2017,
12–43). As Sarai Aharoni has argued, WPS-related
norms have been helpful in allowing activists to chal-
lenge domestic patriarchy within Israel, but their utility
for peace-building has been minimal (Aharoni 2014). In
short, WPS discourse now includes a limited codification
of WPS in Israeli national law with regard to women’s
political participation, and at the same time articulates
active opposition to Israeli occupation in the form of
the Palestinian NAP. The point is less to endorse or
denounce these strategic framings than to note how
our analysis reveals WPS to be a field of contention in
which antagonistic parties may find resources for their
own positions under a nominally common umbrella.
These points of fracture become visible only when the
agenda is understood as something other than a single
normative project hampered primarily by problems of
implementation and translation.
What Is WPS?
To yield quantitative data about the constitutive issues
of the WPS agenda, we used content analysis software
(NVivo 12) to run frequency searches of keywords. The
searches were run across the full policy set (213 docu-
ments) and our three subsets separately. The search terms
are shown in table 1, divided into “pillar” and “non-
pillar” issues. The latter were derived as search terms
from a combined strategy of “coding whilst browsing”—
documenting which words were appearing with
relative frequency—and reviewing the scholarly lit-
erature on WPS that indicates which issues are perceived
as animating the agenda at any given point.24 Search
results were transcribed into Excel and tabulated by
frequency over time in order to show how the agenda
is (re)produced. We document the relative influence of
differing conceptions and elements of the WPS ecology
below, using the occurrence of key terms, weighted by
the number of WPS documents published in that year as
our indicator.
24 We do not include a comprehensive list of scholarship
on the growing complexity of WPS but see recently
Kirby and Shepherd (2016), Holvikivi and Reeves (2017),
and Thomson and Pierson (2018).
In selecting these terms, we have attended to exist-
ing WPS terms of art. It is a convention within the WPS
literature to discuss the agenda’s substantive issue ar-
eas of focus in terms of “pillars” of action: the preven-
tion of violence; the protection of women’s rights and
bodies; the participation of women in peace and secu-
rity governance; and the adoption of a gendered perspec-
tive on post-conflict humanitarian relief and recovery.25
The “four pillars” are a prevalent shorthand and thus en-
able a mapping of WPS politics in terms of their distri-
bution. This is especially so for the UN Security Coun-
cil as a source of political discourse. Council resolutions
are argued over in detail, carefully choreographed, and
understood to have far-reaching ramifications based on
the precise placement of terms, the sequencing of opera-
tive paragraphs, and the composition of the Council at
the time of issuing (Johnstone 2005; Shepherd 2008).
We are thus able to bracket long-running theoretical and
meta-theoretical debates about discourse and significa-
tion (see Holzscheiter 2014 for a discussion). In the case
of WPS, there is a clear and meaningful relationship be-
tween key terms and the policy approach that they sig-
nal. An NAP that includes no language on women’s par-
ticipation is positioned relative to the wider field by a
quite specific and non-trivial difference. It is not surpris-
ing then that only 2NAPs out of the 125we studiedmade
no mention of participation: the 2007 Netherlands and
2009 Guinea NAPs.26 The non-pillar issues we track do
not command the same consensus, but here too the signif-
icance of language is well-demarcated by larger patterns
of institutionalization.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the attention given
to the four pillars from the start of the agenda un-
til the end of 2018, covering all the documents in our
dataset (n = 213). Each “ribbon” of color represents
the weighted number of mentions of the relevant search
term.27 The growth in mentions of the pillars, even
25 These pillars are generally deemed to derive from
UNSCR 1325, but they were first laid out in the Septem-
ber 2007 Report of the Secretary-General onWPS. Orig-
inally a fifth “normative” thematic area was listed, but
after 2010 became incorporated throughout as a “cross-
cutting” element and has largely fallen away in subse-
quent policy practice.
26 Each expressed the same point in different language—
the Dutch NAP through references to “involvement”
and “improved position” of women; the Guinean in ref-
erences to “involvement” and “integration.”
27 In this and subsequent figures, we indicate the
weighted mentions for search terms in the final year
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Table 1. Search terms queried in NVivo
Concept Actual search term
Pillar issues Prevention Prevention
Participation Participation
Protection Protection
Humanitarian (relief and recovery) Humanitarian
Non-pillar new issues Refugee/IDP Asylum or refugee or displaced
Disasters Disasters
LGBTQI+ LBQ or LGBT or LGBTQ or LGBTQI or LGBTQIA or
gay or lesbian or queer or homosexual
SRH Reproductive
Human trafficking Traffick
Climate change Environment or climate or environmental
Transitional justice mechanisms “Transitional justice” or reconciliation or reparations
Men and boys “Men and boys”
Human rights defenders “human rights defenders”
Small arms and light weapons “Arms trade” or “small arms” or “light weapons”
Terrorism/extremism Terrorism or terror or terrorist or extremism or
extremist or radical or radicalized or radicalised or
radicalisation or radicalization
Figure 3. Mention of the four pillars in all documents over time (2000–2018, n= 213, weighted by number of documents published
each year).
document category. In this figure, we have provided
values for each of the four pillar search terms. In the
remaining figures, we indicate the highest and lowest
value search terms for 2018 and also include a third
value for a search term in the middle range for that doc-
ument category. Full details on the breakdown of men-
tions per document and the exact values for each year
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correcting for the increase in the overall number of
WPS documents, is indicative of a consolidation of the
agenda around these terms. This accords with the ap-
proach taken in the scholarly literature on WPS, where
the pillars are increasingly invoked as the constitutive el-
ements of the agenda, raising questions about the bal-
ance to be struck between them, and the differing mean-
ings that may be invested in the same terms (see e.g.,
Basu and Shepherd 2017 on “prevention”). We do not
dwell overly on these findings here, as an impressive lit-
erature on the role of the pillars in WPS discourse al-
ready exists (see Puechguirbal 2010; Otto 2010; Aroussi
2011; Hagen 2016; Ni Aolain 2016; Basu and Confor-
tini 2017). Research into the language of Security Coun-
cil resolutions has tracked a trend from the broader base
of the agenda—in which participation in all its senses was
primary—to an increasing fixation on sexual violence as
an exemplary atrocity, activating the “protection” side of
the agenda to the detriment of the deep social, political,
and economic transformations implied by alternative ar-
ticulations of WPS (Aroussi 2011; Shepherd 2011). This
trend is by no means uncontested. Indeed, practitioners
and activists have been keenly aware of it, and different
resolutions issued by the Security Council may be read
as signs of an ongoing struggle over the parameters of
canonical WPS (see the discussion in Kirby and Shepherd
2016, 379–83).
Our findings broadly confirm these patterns for the
WPS system at large, with “participation” and “protec-
tion” the most widely invoked terms, and post-conflict
relief, reconstruction, and recovery consistently the least
mentioned after 2003. In the UN system documents, the
fortunes of participation, prevention, and protection are
closely intertwined since 2006, with no pillar predomi-
nating throughout. By contrast, the hierarchy of pillars is
less ambiguous in the set of NAPs, with participation the
most invoked for every year since 2005, and protection in
second place in nearly every year until 2016, when men-
tions of prevention overtake it, reflecting the grammar
of anti-terrorism measures rather than the prevention of
conflict at large.
As the agenda has grown, so too have new issues been
added to its remit, sometimes through the canonical texts
of the Security Council, other times through innovations
by other WPS actors. In themselves, these moves consti-
tute an important archive for studies of agenda-setting
and the salience of advocacy frames. Mapping the fre-
quency of non-pillar issues across our three categories
of documents advances two further aims. First, by look-
ing to the emergence of more discrete terms, we are able
to sharpen our analysis of the pillars themselves. “New”
issue areas do not arise in splendid isolation from previ-
ous debates, but instead often represent a particular in-
terpretation of the WPS mandate. This is the case for
references to terrorism and extremism as a variety of
“protection” and “prevention,” for transitional justice
as a tool of “participation,” and for references to sex-
ual and gender identity and men and boys as signals of
the agenda shifting away from general categorizations
of “women.”28 Second, we are able to more concretely
establish whether and how the agenda is being recali-
brated. Is the agenda pluralizing, as many observers sus-
pect? If so, what does the take-up of new terms tell us
about the actors that constitute the ecosystem of WPS?
What tensions and conflictual relations enter the ecosys-
tem through its growth?
As argued above, it is possible to identify 2010 as
the point of consolidation, and it is evident from the
dataset we have curated that issue areas proliferate af-
ter that point. We frame this as “pluralization”: the
(re)production of new issues within the remit of the
WPS agenda (which, in turn, constitutes what “the WPS
agenda” is—and what it is not). The increased diversity
of WPS issues is most evident in figure 4, which shows
marked increases, across the totality of WPS documents
in the ecosystem, in references to the following: asylum
seekers, refugees, or displaced persons (after an outlier
peak in 2002); terrorism or extremism; trafficking; tran-
sitional justice; disasters; and “men and boys.”29 Engage-
ment with issues like climate change and arms control
fluctuates. We are also able to discern a recent uptick
in attention to LGBTQ issues, although the incorpora-
tion of sexual orientation and gender identity remains
extremely limited (see also Hagen 2016).
Examining the constituent parts of the agenda re-
veals different emphases on these “new issues,” which
28 On the gender binary, see Hagen (2016).
29 A note on our coding decisions is in order here.
WPS documents are replete with references to
men as the critical comparator category for gender
equality, as in statements of the form “the impor-
tance of equal participation of men and women in
preventing and resolving conflict” (Ministry of De-
fence of the Republic of Serbia 2017, 7). In such
formulations men are not mentioned in connection to
activities (such as programs to promote positive mas-
culinity), but a standard against which the increased
participation of women is to be assessed. The com-
bined phrase “men and boys” better captures attempts
to recognize, in the words of one recent NAP, that “men
and boys . . . may be opponents of or advocates for
gender equality, as well as survivors of gender-based
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Figure 4. Mentions of new issues in WPS agenda over time (2000–2018, n = 213, weighted by number of documents published
each year).
reinforces the extent to which (re)production varies and
is varied by/in different entities. Figure 5, for exam-
ple, shows that references to extremism/terrorism are al-
most entirely absent from regional organization and re-
lated WPS documents, appearing only in 2004 and then
disappearing until 2012. The same issue was included
at a lower level in NAPs, starting in 2007 with the
Austrian NAP, with attention spiking after 2016 (see
figure 6). This is despite the absence of references to ex-
tremism or terrorism in the WPS resolutions—arguably
the closest thing to the origin policy of the agenda—until
2015.Terrorism and violent extremism have now become
a major WPS issue across all three-document categories,
underlining the highly contentious grafting of contem-
porary security practices to feminist attempts to stymie
militarism through the agenda (see Ní Aoláin 2016 for
a wider discussion). Importantly, the arrival of terrorism
and violent extremism as terms across the three docu-
mentary sets predates their appearance in the WPS reso-
lutions themselves, again upending the conventional logic
of policy transfer and norm diffusion.
Table 2 summarizes the top three non-pillar issues in
our three categories of WPS document over time, as mea-
sured by number of mentions weighted by number of
documents in five-year periods (and a four-year period
for 2015–2018). As might be expected from its some-
times humanitarian role, the focus in UN documents is
consistently on asylum, refugee, and displacement issues,
and it is notable that this emphasis is mirrored in national
initiatives and less consistently in regional and otherWPS
policies. Transitional justice concerns have also been to
the fore.NAPs are more likely to include references to hu-
man and sex trafficking, indicating the role of the state’s
police function on the more coercive end ofWPS practice.
Among regional and other national bodies, we note
the surprising appearance of reproductive rights in the
2005–2009 period, driven by several documents that
made links between WPS and development priorities,
such as the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Gender Policy, the SADC Protocol on Gender
and Development, and to a lesser extent the European
Union’s comprehensive approach to the implementation
of 1325 and 1820. Perhaps most surprisingly, climate
change and environment issues have been a major focus
in regional and other WPS approaches since the advent
of the agenda. This finding underscores the importance
of examining the intersection of WPS with other policy
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Figure 5. Mentions of new issues in “Other WPS” documents over time (2003–2018, n = 33, weighted by number of documents
published each year).
African Union, the Organisation for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe, and the South African Development
Community which most often emphasized the gendered
impact of climate change in the first decade of the agenda.
These documents integrated WPS commitments along-
side other priorities, rather than being singularly focused
on the narrower security dimension more characteristic
of canonical agenda artifacts.
The limited but growing energy in the WPS ecosys-
tem around LGBTQI issues and concerns has been
generated not by Council resolutions, but by other UN
entities and occasional national government policy. By
our count, there are no mentions of the applicability
of the agenda to LGBTQI people before 2011, where
they are first mentioned in the United States’ NAP, and
thereafter most mentions come via reports of the UN
Secretary-General.30 These issues are almost completely
30 The multiple iterations of WPS policy by the US govern-
ment make for an instructive case study in the contesta-
tion of the agenda’s content. While there were several
references to LGBTQI issues in the 2011 and 2016 US
NAPs, there were none in the most recent US Strategy
on WPS, issued by the Trump administration in 2019.
absent in policy generated by other WPS actors and
from the WPS resolutions themselves. These examples
demonstrate that the issues under the remit of the agenda
are pluralizing, and, importantly, that the pluralizing
impetus is not driven by any one source or actor. Dif-
ferent entities represent and therefore (re)produce the
agenda in different ways over time. Many more issues
are considered part of WPS than the four pillars of
prevention, protection, participation, and relief and
recovery; the pluralization of issues extends the field of
concern of WPS and fundamentally changes how it can
be understood as the object of research and practice.
The final dimension of plurality to which we draw
attention is that of the actors shaping WPS policy. We
have already shown how WPS is taken up by different
organizations at multiple levels of governance: here we
note which parts of the machinery of government are
involved in WPS implementation, as shown in figure 8.
Aisling Swaine (2009) has convincingly argued that the
location of NAPs within the machinery of government
is politically salient, demonstrating through her analy-
sis that the focus of the NAP (whether it is domestic
or foreign-policy focused) and its level of influence will
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Figure 6. Mentions of new issues in NAPs over time (2005–2018, n= 125, weighted by number of documents published each year).
Table 2. Top three non-pillar issues in each document category by five-year period
Time period UN system NAPs Other WPS
2000–2004 Refugee/IDP N/A Climate change
Trafficking Refugee/IDP
Transitional justice Trafficking
2005–2009 Refugee/IDP Refugee/IDP Climate change
Transitional justice Trafficking Trafficking + reproductive rights
Climate change + reproductive rights Transitional justice Transitional justice
2010–2014 Refugee/IDP Refugee/IDP Refugee/IDP
Transitional justice Trafficking Climate change
Small arms and light weapons Transitional justice Terrorism and extremism
2015–2018 Terrorism and extremism Refugee/IDP Climate change
Refugee/IDP Terrorism and extremism Terrorism and extremism
Transitional justice Trafficking Reproductive rights
instructive to map the NAPs as a component of the WPS
ecosystem to explore the range of lead agencies involved
in coordinating WPS activity.
We find, as shown in figure 8, both that there are evi-
dent consistencies—in the placement of the NAPs within
ministries for foreign affairs, or similar, and in ministries
charged with oversight of gender equality programming
or the advancement of women—but also emerging pat-
terns. In Romania (2014), Serbia (2017), and Montene-
gro (2017), NAPs were launched that were situated
within or co-ordinated by ministries of defense. Relat-
edly, the third iteration of the Dutch NAP sits with
civil society as an implementing actor; this move reflects
the fact that many civil society actors and activists ex-
press a strong sense of ownership over the resolution
and the agenda more broadly.31 Figure 9 shows how the
31 Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, co-founder and international
coordinator of the Global Network of Women Peace-
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Figure 7. Mentions of new issues in UN WPS docs over time (2000–2018, n = 55, weighted by number of documents published
each year).
pluralization across the different lead agencies plays
out geographically: in Africa and the Middle East, the
vast majority of NAPs sit with ministries for gender or
women, while in Europe and the Americas it is the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs (or equivalent) that is most likely
to take the lead. The latter regions, however, and as
shown in figure 8, are also the areas where NAP respon-
sibility is pluralizing. Several dynamics are evident. The
move to defense, and the Dutch allocation of responsi-
bility to civil society, along with the increasing numbers
of NAPs managed or overseen by whole-of-government
task forces or inter-agency working groups, all challenge
a monolithic reading that aligns responsible agency with
region (of the kind that suggests that Global South NAPs
tend to be inward-looking while those produced in the
Global North tend to look outward; see Shepherd 2016),
of the WPS agenda: “I still recall one GNWP member
from the conflict-affectedMount Elgon district in Kenya
who said to me: ‘The first time I read Resolution 1325,
I held it close to my chest. This is ours; this belongs
to us’” (Cabrera-Balleza 2011; on the “narratives of pro-
duction” of the foundational resolution, see Shepherd
2008).
at least inviting a closer look at the way responsibil-
ity is pluralizing in those locations. These data also re-
veal likely imminent fracture, as locating the NAP within
defense brings with it a certain set of protocols and
expectations that would be absent, for example, when
the NAP is located with civil society or a ministry for
social affairs. Future research is needed to explore these
pluralizing and fracturing dynamics within the WPS
ecosystem.
The analysis presented here reveals some striking and
unexpected dynamics organizing the field of WPS activ-
ity. It is not just the case that the various elements of the
agenda are “contested,” a formulation that assumes that
the agenda is a somewhat stable or settled policy entity
that actors diverge from. The above analysis shows that
the meanings given to WPS in various locations, by var-
ious actors, and across various time periods, are highly
mutable, challenging the treatment of “the WPS agenda”
as a single object of analysis. At a minimum, our anal-
ysis demonstrates the utility of a different perspective
on WPS, and we have proposed that “policy ecosystem”
is a useful way of thinking about the field of activity,
actors, and artifacts that is described by the shorthand
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Figure 8. Category of NAP lead agency over time (2005–2018, n = 125).
plurality of WPS actors reproduces the agenda in com-
plex and divergent ways; our analysis identifies states
working alongside a diverse collection of other formal
institutions, domestic, regional, and supranational, all of
which implement the agenda in ways that may involve
symmetry or divergence.We have also shown that,within
and across categories, there is surprising variation in
the issues deemed to fall under the auspices of the
agenda. Yet our dataset captures only the surface of the
ecosystem, as these are the entities empowered to make
“official” policy, and so do not include the array of civil
society organizations and social movements that agitate
for gender inclusivity and feminist peace. Our map is
therefore not comprehensive, but our perspective under-
scores the importance of looking beyond the canonical
features of the agenda.
Conclusion
We have shown that the field of WPS activity is highly
variegated and has identified dynamics of pluralization
and fracture in the reproduction of the WPS agenda
through its various policy artifacts. Existing conceptual-
izations of WPS as a norm, or normative framework, do
not adequately capture either the tensions or the com-
plexity of the agenda’s development over time, nor do
they resonate with the nonlinearity and multiplicity of
its reproduction (which involves many different and vari-
ously dis/connected actors, institutions, and ideas). At the
time of writing, the adoption of the most recent WPS res-
olutions is still fresh in the minds of many who work in
the field (UNSCR 2467 and UNSCR 2493, adopted in
April and October 2019, respectively); the process of ne-
gotiation, and the eventual content, of resolution 2467
specifically has been described as a “decisive setback”
for the agenda (Ní Aoláin 2019) because of its weakened
language on sexual and reproductive health (SRH) rights
for survivors of sexual violence. The US government had
threatened to veto the resolution—championed by Ger-
many, which held the presidency of the Council at the
time—if the wording about SRH was not removed. The
negotiations went right through to the Security Council
Open Debate, during which the draft text was amended
further, removing reference to UNSCR 2106 (which pre-
viously articulated the agenda’s commitment to uphold-
ing the SRH rights of survivors) to the preamble of the
resolution. Having presented a collaborative draft res-
olution of their own on the topic of sexual violence in
conflict (largely seen as an effort to maximize the gains
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Figure 9. Percentage of NAPs within each lead agency, by region (2005–2018, n = 125).
unified supporters bitterly divided), China and Russia ab-
stained from the vote on UNSCR 2467, making it the
only WPS resolution not be to adopted by unanimous
vote.
As this brief vignette demonstrates, the decoherence
and fracture we identify through our broader analysis
above can be evident for practitioners and observers at
crucial moments but is lost in broader narratives of nor-
mative development. The testing of a norm such as the
protection of SRH rights (thought previously to be set-
tled or at least broadly agreed upon within the agenda
and enshrined within the operative paragraphs of WPS
resolutions; e.g., UNSCR 1889, para. 10; UNSCR 2106,
para. 19) in the further development of the agenda’s pol-
icy framework, shows the extent to which the reproduc-
tion of the agenda is an iterative process of stabilization
and destabilization, of pluralization and fracture. Most
critically, our analysis shows that the agenda is comprised
not of a discrete set of identifiable norms but rather of a
plural, overlapping, and ambiguous set of norms, ideas,
principles, deeply held personal beliefs, and policy ac-
tions. Our hope is that the analysis we present above be-
gins to use the complexity of the field of study as a way
of gaining analytical clarity.
In presenting the most systematic analysis of WPS
policy to date, we have emphasized the diversity of the
agenda and its multiple locations of enunciation.Our ap-
proach has yielded a range of insights into the agenda’s
development, its current parameters and actors, and the
changing constellation of issue areas that constitute it.
We have further proposed that a shift from conceptu-
alizing WPS as a norm or normative framework to the
concept of policy ecosystem permits the theorization of
policy development as a process of (re)production and
differentiation. The agenda is constantly being written
and re-written. Both the issues that are conceived of as
WPS issues, and the infrastructure within which WPS ac-
tors interact, are changing in ways that fundamentally
challenge the interpretation of implementation as a story
of singular, unitary, and unidirectional policy develop-
ment or norm diffusion.
Our argument has two major implications. First, with
regard to the WPS agenda itself, we provide substan-
tial reasons to permanently reorient the research agenda
away from a notion of policy change cascading out from
the texts of the UN Security Council, and toward the rela-
tional and interactive dynamics of multiple actors within
a variegated field. While it will remain profitable to as-
sess WPS case studies and measure the success or other-
wise of diverse initiatives, this should be set in the wider
context of the agenda’s porous boundaries and internal
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efforts at contextualization. Second, for the wider analy-
sis of norms and policy, we join others in suggesting that
greater sensitivity to the politics of (re)production will
better capture the ways in which policies become are-
nas for contestation, adaptation, and transformation. It
may be objected that the WPS agenda is a sui generis
agenda, or at least strikingly different from the norms
and policies usually of interest to IR scholars. We are
not able here to undertake a comparative analysis, but
point to initial evidence of similar policy forms such as
the recent UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Pre-
vent Violent Extremism, which encourages UN member
states to develop “national plans of action” with a dis-
tinctively WPS flavor (United Nations General Assembly
2015, para. 44). Given the resources that are invested,
both intellectual and material, in investigating and docu-
menting implementation gaps and failures, how may we
explore the dynamics of policy in a way that attends not
only to the technical detail of texts or the normative hori-
zon toward which they aim, but also to the expanse of re-
lations and struggles that animate, remake, and frustrate
agendas, plural?
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